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Abstract This paper investigates how parametric reform in a pay-as-you-go
pension system with a tax–benefit link affects retirement and work incentives
of prime-age workers. We find that postponed retirement tends to harm
incentives of prime-age workers in the presence of a tax–benefit link, thereby
creating a policy trade-off in stimulating aggregate labor supply. We show how
several popular reform scenarios are geared either towards young or old work-
ers or, indeed, both groups under appropriate conditions. We characterize the
excess burden of pension insurance and show how it depends on the supply
elasticities of both decision margins and the effective tax rates.
Keywords Pension reform · Retirement · Tax–benefit link
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1 Introduction
In light of the concerns faced by policy makers regarding the long-run funding
of public pensions, many countries have initiated reforms. Apart from the need
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to restore sustainability to pension systems, these reforms are importantly
motivated by the concerns regarding the potentially adverse consequences
of existing programs for labor market incentives. For these reasons, most
countries have initiated reforms that (1) strengthen the tax–benefit link by, for
instance, bringing more people into a harmonized pension system in which
pensions are assessed on the basis of past earnings, and (2) introduce more
actuarial fairness in order to provide disincentives, or “penalties,”for early
retirement and to improve the incentives for labor market participation of
older workers nearing retirement. It has been long recognized that the tax
character of pension contributions tends to discourage work effort of the
actively employed (intensive labor supply). This has led policy makers to
propose a tighter tax–benefit link to reduce distortions in the labor supply
decision faced by younger workers. More recently, the date, or timing, of the
retirement decision has received increasing attention. To raise the average
retirement age, recent reforms often include adjustments of the pension size
to provide stronger incentives for continued work (extensive labor supply).1
The important interactions between the incentives facing younger and older
workers are less well-known. Rewarding late retirement might have adverse
consequences for implicit taxes borne by younger workers. Some reform
alternatives might succeed in strengthening labor supply on both margins by
encouraging work effort of younger workers and, simultaneously, participation
of older workers. Other scenarios might favor one margin at the expense of
the other, with possibly no clear-cut net effect on aggregate labor supply. The
goal of this paper is to develop a formal model that helps to clarify how the
incentives of young and old workers interact and how pension reforms might
give rise to either off-setting or mutually reinforcing effects on aggregate labor
supply.
There is a large literature on pension economics and old-age insurance; see,
for example, Feldstein and Liebman (2002), Bovenberg (2003), Lindbeck and
Persson (2003), and Fenge and Pestieau (2005) for a few important reviews.
The recent policy debate in the USA has focussed to a great extent on
the choice between increased capital funding (e.g., Kotlikoff 1997; Feldstein
2005a, b; Feldstein and Samwick 2002) vs parametric reform of existing
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems (e.g., Diamond 2004; Diamond and Orszag
2005). Apart from its impact on national savings, the potential labor market
implications of public pensions have always played an important role in this
debate. An on-going concern is the effect on intensive labor supply, i.e., hours
worked by the active generation. In this regard, the crucial question is the
extent to which the contributions to social security are actually perceived
as a tax by the active generation. The answer depends, of course, on the
institutional design of the PAYG system. In a system with a tax–benefit link
in which pensions are based on past earnings, the effective tax rate can amount
1Policies to encourage earlier retirement are not unknown, however. See Bratberg et al. (2004) for
an analysis of an early retirement program that was instituted in Norway in 1989.
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to roughly half of the statutory contribution rate, as recent calculations for
Germany by Fenge and Werding (2004) have shown. Beginning with Feldstein
and Samwick (1992), the existing literature has calculated a much higher tax
component for young workers far from retirement, while the effective tax is, in
contrast, much lower for workers nearing retirement. Disney (2004) provided
recent computations of the effective tax rates implied by PAYG contribu-
tions and econometric estimates of the employment effects. The results are
consistent with usual findings of the empirical literature on intensive labor
supply, namely, that male employment is not particularly responsive to tax
incentives, while female activity rates are highly adversely affected by the
effective contribution tax.
According to the influential studies of Gruber and Wise (1999a, b, 2002),
a serious problem associated with PAYG systems is that they impose signif-
icant disincentives to work at older ages. Gruber and Wise (2005) provide
calculations for the relationship between later retirement and the additional
benefits that lead to actuarial fairness. Börsch-Supan (2000, 2003) provides
evidence on the participation decisions of older German workers. Scarpetta
(1996) finds empirical evidence supporting this phenomenon in a cross-country
study. A major factor behind the “trend” toward early retirement is that
existing PAYG systems distort the labor supply decision on the extensive
margin and thereby encourage early retirement. Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999)
suggest that early retirement provisions in many countries have led to a
dramatic decrease in the labor force participation among older workers. The
fact that benefits are not adjusted in an actuarially fair manner is a key reason
for this large distortion on the extensive margin. Theoretical work on social
security and retirement decisions is inspired by the seminal contributions of
Feldstein (1974), Sheshinski (1978), and Diamond and Mirrlees (1978). More
recent theoretical contributions on the (optimal) design of pension systems in
the presence of a retirement decision are found, for example, in Breyer and
Kifmann (2002), Cremer and Pestieau (2003), and Cremer et al. (2004).2
The novel contribution of this paper is to shed more light on how the struc-
ture of existing PAYG pension systems simultaneously affects the intensive
and extensive margins of labor supply. In particular, the paper will show how
the effective tax rate on the intensive labor supply of younger workers and
the participation tax rate faced by older workers, and, thus, the extensive and
intensive labor supply responses, interact with each other. How they interact
depends crucially on the specific institutional design of the system. We are
able to provide a sharper characterization of the excess burden of a PAYG
pension system that brings out the parallels with the recent literature, found
2See Fenge and Pestieau (2005) for a review. Breyer and Hupfeld (2007) point out the distribu-
tional effects of pension reform towards more actuarial fairness. Bommier et al. (2005) emphasize
redistribution towards the short-lived, while Cremer et al. (2004) focus on redistribution towards
the ill. The redistributional implications of retirement incentives are, nevertheless, not the focus
of this paper.
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in Kleven and Kreiner (2006), Immervoll et al. (2007), and Saez (2002), on
labor taxation in the presence of intensive and extensive supply. We show how
the excess burden depends (1) on the behavioral elasticities with respect to
prime-age labor supply and the retirement decision of older workers and (2)
on the effective tax rates for these two groups. We then turn to parametric
pension reform and derive the behavioral response and welfare implications of
strengthening the tax–benefit link and introducing more actuarial fairness by
making the pension eligibility rules more sensitive to the choice of the retire-
ment date. These are important reform strategies chosen by numerous coun-
tries in the recent past. To our knowledge, a rigorous analysis of a marginal
reform of the tax–benefit link by making it more sensitive with respect to
retirement age is also novel.3
To focus on the essential mechanisms, the model we consider is a simple
one. Agents are risk-neutral, live two periods, and make an intensive labor
supply decision when young and an extensive, participation choice in the
second period of life. Production technology is Ricardian and labor markets
are competitive. Consumer–workers make their choices subject to a general
pension earnings rule that conveniently parameterizes different degrees of
actuarial fairness and encompasses the most important specifications of actual
pension systems: (1) a Beveridge-type system in which “flat” old-age earnings
are independent of contributions; (2) a Bismarckian PAYG system that incor-
porates a constant tax–benefit link, although one that is not sensitive to the
chosen retirement age and is, thus, actuarially unfair; (3) a modified PAYG
system that actuarially adjusts—in the sense of Gruber–Wise—the pension
rule according to the participation decision; and (4) a fully funded system in
which contributions yield the market rate of interest and pension earnings are
adjusted to take into account the chosen length of the retirement period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
households and their intensive and extensive labor supply decisions subject to
the structure of the PAYG system. This part of the paper also outlines the
equilibrium OLG framework and calculates the responses of intensive and
extensive work effort to a socioeconomic trend toward early retirement,
including its impact on the pension system. In Section 3, we introduce the
welfare measure, compute the consequences of a higher statutory contribution
rate, and characterize the marginal excess burden resulting from the expansion
of the system. Section 4 is devoted to parametric pension reform, including
several scenarios of strengthening the tax–benefit link and introducing a
greater degree of actuarial fairness. The paper closes in Section 5 with a brief
summary.
3While it is a crucial issue, an analysis of the political sustainability of the reform scenarios we
consider is beyond the scope of this paper. See Galasso and Profeta (2004) for a quantitative
political economy model of pension reform in an ageing society with an endogenously chosen
PAYG contribution rate.
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2 The model
2.1 Households
In order to concentrate on labor market behavior of young and old workers,
we keep the macroeconomic framework as simple as possible. Regarding
representative consumer–workers, we assume they live two periods and are
risk-neutral. Leaving aside issues related to savings, we make the simplifying
assumption that present and future consumption, ct, t = 1, 2, are prefect
substitutes. In other words, agents care only about the present value and
not the timing of consumption. In assuming a Ricardian framework, labor
productivity is the same in both periods and is fixed at unity.4 With competitive
labor markets, the (real) wage is also unity, MPL = W = 1, and there is no
unemployment.
We specify further that agents face the choice of how hard to work when
young and when to retire when old. The former is an intensive labor supply
decision, L, while the extensive labor supply margin reflects a discrete partic-
ipation decision of whether to work at all. The retirement date is denoted by
x and corresponds to the share of the overall old-age period spent in active
employment. First- and second-period budgets (normalized by the fixed wage
rate of unity) correspond to:
c1 = (1 − τ) L − s, c2 = x · (1 − τ) + (1 − x) · p + Rs, (1)
where s is savings, τ is the statutory contribution rate to the pension system, p
represents pension earnings, and R (≡ 1 + r) is the (constant) interest factor.
During the second period of life, the agent continues working for a share x
of the entire period and retires for the remaining part 1 − x. We refer to the
variable x as the retirement date. Upon retirement, wage earnings are replaced
by pension income. To further simplify, we assume that labor supply in the
second period is fixed.
Life-time utility of an agent is of the usual intertemporally separable form.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume preferences are additively separable
between consumption and work effort within each period and thereby exclude
income effects on labor supply. Since our analysis is concerned with the effects
of pension reform on labor market behavior rather than on savings, we also
assume preferences are linear in consumption. In consequence, agents care
only about the present value but not the timing of consumption. With present
and future consumption being perfectly substitutable, the interest rate must be
equal to the rate of time preference and is, thus, exogenous:
V = c1 − ϕ (L) + 1R · [c2 − γφ (x)] . (2)
4Our framework abstracts from a human capital accumulation decision. See Lau and Poutvaara
(2006) for an analysis of the interactions between social security and human capital.
774 W.H. Fisher, C. Keuschnigg
The parameter γ scales the preference for early vs late retirement. Disutility of
work effort ϕ (L) when young and of continued employment φ (x) during old
age are convex increasing, i.e., the derivatives ϕ′, ϕ′′, φ′, and φ′′ are all positive.5
Since it is crucial in analyzing alternative pension policies, we must describe
in detail the factors influencing pension earnings, p. They are given by:
p = m (x) [τ L · Rp + τx] + b , (3)
where b is a “flat” pension payment independent of contributions. The pension
system might pay interest on contributions, which is reflected by the factor Rp.
The key relationship in our analysis is the conversion factor m(x) that scales
contributions from past earnings into a pension entitlement. It reflects the tax–
benefit link that can be actuarially adjusted depending on old-age labor market
participation, or retirement, decision x. The specification Eq. 3 encompasses
several distinct pension regimes: (1) a Beveridge-type system (m(x) = 0) in
which “flat” old-age earnings are independent of contributions, p = b ; (2)
a Bismarckian PAYG system that incorporates a constant tax–benefit link,
m(x) = m0 > 0, with b = 0 and Rp = 1. If the conversion factor does not
increase in the retirement date, the system remains unfair in the sense that
pension adjustment does not reflect the length of the remaining life-time, equal
to 1 − x; (3) a modified PAYG system with an actuarial adjustment of pensions
conditional on the retirement date (“Gruber–Wise” incentives), m′(x) > 0;
and (4) a fully funded system in which contributions earn the market rate of
interest, Rp = R, and pension earnings are adjusted to take into account the
length of the retirement period so that m(x) = 1/(1 − x).6
To model the implications of a number of structural pension reforms, we
assume that the pension conversion factor reflecting the tax–benefit link, m (x),
takes the specification:
m = m(x) = α
1 − x + m0, α > 0, (4)
which embeds an actuarial adjustment component α/ (1 − x) and a constant
term m0 scaling the tax–benefit link. Actuarial adjustment is partial if 0 <
α < 1 and complete if α = 1. Given Eqs. 3 and 4, the Bismarck-type pension
equals p = m0τ [L + x], while its fully capital funded counterpart is p =
(1 − x)−1 τ [L · R + x], with b = m0 = 0. Substituting the pension formula of
the funded system into the budget identities of the agent shows that life-
time wealth is independent of the parameters of the pension system, i.e.,
c1 + c2/R = L + x/R. The fully funded system provides a perfect substitute
for private savings and is fully neutral in this framework.
5Appendix C describes how our specification of preferences is related to standard assumptions in
the literature that are found in Cigno (2008) and Fenge and Pestieau (2005), among others.
6As Feldstein (2005a) points out, the absence of a tax–benefit link implies that an agent’s
contributions represent a 100% tax rate. Regarding PAYG systems with a tax–benefit link, Fenge
and Werding (2004) provide evidence that approximately 50% of contributions in Germany are
effectively a tax.
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The pure funded system eliminates the effective tax rates on both the
intensive labor supply of prime age workers and the participation decision
of older workers (see below, Eqs. 6 and 12). The analysis here also shows
that three conditions must be fulfilled for complete actuarial fairness in both
dimensions of labor supply: (1) past contributions must earn a rate of return
equal to the return on private savings, Rp = R; (2) the conversion factor fully
reflects expected remaining life-time, m = 1/ (1 − x) and m0 = 0; and (3) there
is no lump-sum, flat pension component, b = 0. A violation of one of these
conditions results in a positive effective pension tax on one of the two margins
of labor supply, as the discussion of effective tax rates below will show.
Substituting the budget identities into the value function V yields the
problem:
V = max
L,x
(1 − τ) L − ϕ (L) + 1
R
[
x (1 − τ) + (1 − x) p − γφ (x)] , (5)
subject to p determined by Eqs. 3 and 4. The optimality condition with respect
to a young worker’s labor supply decision is:
ϕ′ (L) = (1 − τL) , τL = τ ·
[
1 − (1 − x) m · Rp/R] < τ, (6)
where τL is the implicit tax rate on first-period employment L in the sense
of Feldstein and Samwick (1992). It will be discussed more fully below. The
participation, or retirement, decision of an older worker is governed by:
γφ′ (x) = (1 − τ) − p + (1 − x) ∂p
∂x
, (7)
where the derivative in the last term:
∂p
∂x
= τ · [m′ · (LRp + x) + m] , (8)
reflects the effect on pension earnings of choosing a longer working life x. Since
Eqs. 6–8, together with the economy’s resource constraints, determine the
equilibrium response of workers to pension policy, it is important to analyze
these conditions in more detail.
2.2 Intensive labor supply
Observe in Eq. 6 that the effective tax τL on intensive labor supply is less
than the statutory rate τ . In a system with a tax–benefit link, pensions are
assessed on the basis of past earnings. Greater work effort by the young raises
not only current income but also leads to higher retirement income when old.
This means that not all of the contribution rate is perceived as a “pure” tax.
Agents foresee an individual return in terms of higher pension entitlements
accruing in the retirement period 1 − x. Moreover, the simple relationship in
Eq. 6 contains the essential insights regarding intensive labor supply.
First, contributions earn no interest (Rp = 1) under a PAYG system. Future
benefits are discounted by the market interest rate. The younger an agent, the
more distant future pensions are, and, hence, the larger the discounting is. For
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this reason, empirical calculations, such as in Feldstein and Samwick (1992)
or Fenge and Werding (2004), show that implicit tax rates tend to be rather
high for younger workers and fall as retirement approaches. Second, if the
retirement age x increases, pensions are consumed over a shorter remaining
retirement period. If the conversion factor is not increased simultaneously,
a higher retirement age raises implicit tax rates on the young and leads to a
larger distortion of intensive labor supply. Third, the formula nests the extreme
cases of flat PAYG (Beveridge) and fully funded systems. In a flat system
without any tax–benefit link, m = 0, pension contributions are effectively taxed
at the statutory rate, τL = τ . In contrast, τL is zero under the fully funded
system. The fully funded system pays full interest on contributions, Rp = R,
and also adjusts pension size in an actuarially fair way, m = (1 − x)−1, to take
account of the length of the remaining retirement period. Note that a Gruber–
Wise adjustment for late retirement adjusts the conversion factor in a similar
way and, hence, reduces the implicit tax on young workers. However, since
contributions earn no interest, this adjustment is not sufficient to entirely
eliminate the implicit tax on the young.
Calculating the relative change of intensive labor supply in Eq. 6 yields:
Lˆ = −σ · τˆL, σ ≡ ϕ′/(Lϕ′′) > 0, (9)
where τˆL ≡ dτL/(1 − τL) and σ is the (constant) net wage elasticity of work
effort.7 Clearly, a rise in the implicit tax rate τL reduces first-period labor
supply. As argued above, the implicit tax rate depends, through the tax–benefit
link, on the retirement date x. We now set RP = 1, an assumption we employ
in the rest of the paper, and use m − (1 − x)m′ = m0 from Eq. 4 to obtain:
τˆL = τm0x
(1 − τL) R · xˆ. (10)
Consequently, intensive labor supply of young workers is linked to the retire-
ment behavior—or extensive labor supply—of old agents, according to:
L′(x) = dL
dτL
· dτL
dx
= − < 0,  ≡ σ L
1 − τL ·
m0τ
R
> 0, (11)
reflecting the fact that longer working life raises the effective tax rate on young
workers.
2.3 Retirement decision
We assume that continued employment of older workers leads to progressively
increasing disutility of labor market participation, φ′′ > 0. The retirement
decision in Eq. 7 balances the marginal cost of labor market participation
γφ′ (x) against the income differential between wages and pension earnings
7For a variable y, yˆ represents the relative change yˆ ≡ dy/y. The change in the tax rate is relative
to the tax factor, τˆ ≡ dτ/ (1 − τ).
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that becomes available by marginally postponing retirement. The impact of the
pension system on retirement behavior can be summarized by a single effective
tax measure that is obtained upon rewriting Eq. 7 as:
γφ′ (x) = (1 − τR) , τR ≡ τ + p − (1 − x) ∂p
∂x
, (12)
where τR is a participation tax rate, often called the implicit retirement tax.8
It summarizes all fiscal incentives and disincentives for retirement in a single
metric, which consists of: (1) the wage taxes paid on a worker’s salary, (2) the
pension foregone with continued employment, and (3) the pension increase
over the remaining retirement period if the system incorporates actuarial
adjustment. The “implicit retirement tax” discussed in pension economics liter-
ature is parallel to the participation tax analyzed in the literature on extensive
labor supply such as Saez (2002), Immervoll et al. (2007), and Kleven and
Kreiner (2006). Note, in particular, how an actuarial adjustment of pensions
in the sense of Gruber and Wise (∂p/∂x > 0) lowers the effective retirement
tax. This adjustment compensates for prolonged contribution payments due to
continued work and a shorter retirement period and, hence, a shorter period of
pension take-up. In a Beveridge-type system without a tax–benefit link (m = 0)
and, thus, with a flat pension, the retirement tax would equal τR = τ + p, i.e.,
the sum of the contribution rate τ plus the (normalized) replacement rate p.
Finally, the retirement tax is zero (τR = 0) in the fully funded system. In this
case, the pension is increased in an actuarially fair way when retirement is
postponed in order to compensate for the extra contributions and foregone
pensions over the longer contribution period and the shorter duration of
benefits.
To measure how retirement behavior responds to fiscal incentives, we
calculate the log-derivative of Eq. 12:
xˆ = −η · (τˆR + γˆ
)
, η ≡ φ
′
xφ′′
> 0, (13)
where the parameter η is the elasticity of labor market participation. Participa-
tion declines and retirement occurs earlier if the effective tax rate τR increases.
A larger disutility γ from continued work reflects exogenous socioeconomic
factors leading to a “trend” to earlier retirement, a case that will be explored
in greater detail below.
Since the participation tax rate τR is a function of x, it is important to explore
its properties further. First, it is convenient to express pension earnings in Eq. 3
in terms of the pension assessment base, which we denote by z:
p = m (x) τz(x) + b , z(x) = L (x) + x. (14)
8Sheshinski (1978), among others, show in a formal model that a pension system can encourage
late retirement if benefits increase in the retirement date. Labor supply of active workers was
assumed to be fixed. A major theme of this paper is the interaction of retirement incentives with
labor market behavior of prime age workers.
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With an earnings-linked pension formula, such as Eq. 14, pension entitlements
become sensitive to the retirement date via three channels: (1) postponing
retirement augments the pension assessment base by prolonging the active
working period in old age, which translates into a higher pension depending
on the conversion factor m; (2) postponing retirement increases, however, (see
Eq. 10), the implicit tax rate on young workers, thereby discouraging intensive
labor supply L and shrinking the assessment base, which leads to smaller
pensions; and (3) the system can directly encourage postponed retirement by
raising the conversion factor m. For convenience, we employ primes to denote
the partial derivatives of m, z, and p with respect to x. The first two effects are
summarized by z′ > 0, which is positive if the intensive labor supply elasticity
is not too large.9 The last effect depends on m′ ≥ 0 and is clearly zero if the
system provides no actuarial adjustment with respect to the choice of x. The
sensitivity of pension size with respect to the chosen retirement date is thus:
p′ = τ · [zm′ + mz′] > 0, p′′ = τ · [2z′m′ + zm′′ + mz′′] . (15)
We next analyze the effect of an extended working life on the participation
tax. Differentiating τR given in Eq. 12 with respect to x, substituting Eq. 15,
and using (1 − x) m′′ = 2m′ and m − (1 − x) m′ = m0 from Eq. 4, we obtain:
∂τR
∂x
≡ τ ′R = τ ·
[
2m0z′ − (1 − x) mz′′
] ≥ 0, (16)
where z′′ = L′′ < 0.10 Postponed retirement raises (respectively, leaves unaf-
fected) the participation tax. If there is no tax–benefit link, the participation
tax rate is independent of the retirement date. If the conversion factor remains
fixed and excludes any actuarial adjustment (m0 > 0 and α = 0), then z′ >
0 > z′′, which implies a higher participation tax due to postponed retirement,
τ ′R > 0. If, instead, the conversion factor is actuarially adjusted to the retire-
ment date (m = α/ (1 − x) and m0 = 0), the participation tax is also inde-
pendent of the retirement date. In this case, with (1 − x) m = α, retirement
behavior does not influence the implicit tax on the young, so that first-period
labor supply remains unaffected and the assessment base satisfies z′ = 1 and
z′′ = 0.
2.4 Equilibrium
Our model is very stylized with only three overlapping generations and two
periods. The focus is on generation 1 that is young in period 1 and old in period
2. To close the model, we assume the existence of an initial old generation of
pensioners (generation 0) coexisting in period 1 with the young generation 1.
9To guarantee z′ = 1 + L′ > 0, we assume  < 1 (see Eq. 11 above), which holds for sufficiently
small values of m0 and σ .
10Observe that z′′ is negative. Given the assumption σ < 1, Eqs. 10 and 11 imply z′′ = L′′ = − 1−σ
σ ·L ·
2 < 0.
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We further assume a future generation of workers in period 2 that lives for
one period and coexists with generation 1 when it is old.11 The upper index
identifies generations 0 “old” and f “future,” while variables without an upper
index refer to the active generation 1, which is the only generation living
over the entire two-period life-cycle. The only activity of the old generation
0 is to consume PAYG pensions that must be paid from the contributions of
generation 1:
c0 = p0, V0 = c0/R. (17)
Since our focus is on the behavior of generation 1, we assume away labor
market participation on the part of generation 0. In other words, it is fully
retired. The counterpart of generation 0 is a “future” generation, which lives
for only one period and inelastically supplies one efficiency unit of labor. In
period 2, both the young and the old of generation 1 receive a competitive
wage W = 1. Members of the future generation are assumed to be fully
employed. Their sole activity is to consume fixed labor earnings after paying
contributions to finance pensions of the then old generation 1. This reflects
the fact that any PAYG pension system basically redistributes from future to
present generations:
V f = c f = (1 − τ) . (18)
The budgets of the PAYG system in periods 1 and 2 are:
p0 = τ L, (1 − x) p = τ · (1 + x) , (19)
where we again normalize the wage rate of unity. In the second period, τ
represents the contributions from the future generation and τx from the active
part of the old of generation 1. Consequently, the pension is partly funded by
an intergenerational transfer.12
Given a Ricardian technology, output in period 1 is simply L. Substituting
Eq. 19 into the budget identity Eq. 1 and using Eq. 17 yields the GDP identity
L = c1 + c0 + s for the first period. Output is spent on consumption by young
and old agents and on private investment s.13 In the second period, new output
11Clearly, our model does not incorporate demographic effects such as ageing. Recent work that
considers the implications of ageing on pension systems includes Ono (2003) and Lacomba and
Lagos (2006). Ono (2003) shows that debt-funded social security systems can lead to dynamic
inefficiencies and multiple equilibria, while Lacomba and Lagos (2006) focus on the effects of
ageing on the optimal statutory retirement age. They find the effects depend on whether the
pension system is a defined contribution or defined benefit scheme.
12In the funded system, the budget would apply to each person separately, making the generational
account zero and eliminating intergenerational redistribution: (1 − x) p = τ · (LR + x).
13The investment technology is linear in the coefficient R, and present and future consumption are
perfect substitutes. Since it is not required for the present purposes, we intentionally leave savings
and investment undetermined in our model. Alternatively, we can impose a small open economy
assumption.
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Fig. 1 Early retirement
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1 + x is produced by generation 2 and by the still active part of generation 1. To
obtain output market clearing, we aggregate Eqs. 1 and 18 and substitute for
Eq. 19 to yield: c2 + c f = 1 + x + Rs. Second-period GDP equals new output
plus the yield on first-period investment. Since the world ends thereafter,
output is fully consumed.
2.5 Early retirement
The equilibrium of the economy is fully characterized by a retirement age x
and a “flat,”lump-sum pension b that simultaneously satisfy the extensive labor
market condition (Eq. 12) and the budget constraint (Eq. 19).14 The linearized
versions of these two conditions, which take into account the intensive labor
supply choice in Eq. 11, are derived in part A of the Appendix—see Eqs. 50
and 52—and are illustrated in the x, b plane of Fig. 1. The retirement condition
describes a downward-sloping relationship, since a higher flat pension makes
early retirement more attractive, which reduces the retirement age. In contrast,
the budget condition is upward-sloping, since the PAYG system can support a
greater level of flat pensions over the remaining retirement period only if the
working life of agents is extended. The intersection of the two lines determines
the equilibrium values of x and b .
Before proceeding with an analysis of parametric pension reform, we first
illustrate how an exogenous trend toward early retirement alters labor market
choices on both margins and affects the pension system. An early retirement
“trend” results from exogenous socioeconomic factors and is modeled by
14Our subsequent analysis refers, then, to a defined contribution system in which the contribution
rate is fixed and pension size must ultimately be adjusted to guarantee the system’s solvency.
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an increase in the preference parameter γ that determines the disutility of
old-age labor market participation. Holding the pension parameters fixed,
Eqs. 50 and 52 then simplify to:
xˆ = − η
1 + ηε ·
db
1 − τR −
η
1 + ηε · γˆ, db =
τRx
1 − x · xˆ, (20)
where ε ≡ τ ′Rx/ (1 − τR) is the elasticity of the implicit participation tax. Solv-
ing Eq. 20 for xˆ and db , we find the following equilibrium responses:
xˆ = − η
1 + ηε ·
1
∇ · γˆ < 0,
db = − τRx
1 − x ·
η
1 + ηε ·
1
∇ · γˆ < 0, (21)
∇ ≡ 1 + τR
1 − τR ·
η
1 + ηε ·
x
1 − x > 0.
Not surprisingly, a preference shift toward early retirement reduces partic-
ipation in the old-age labor market, xˆ < 0. Furthermore, it requires budget
consolidation to keep the system sustainable and, thus, leads to pension cuts,
db < 0, as Fig. 1 shows.15 Interestingly, early retirement also reduces the
effective retirement tax in equilibrium:
τˆR = ε · xˆ + db1 − τR < 0. (22)
The result is, again, quite intuitive. Not only does the participation tax decline
when the flat component b of pensions fall, it also declines with an earlier
retirement date x.
The effect of xˆ on the participation tax depends on ε ≡ τ ′Rx/ (1 − τR)
and is present only if the earnings-linked pension is relatively insensitive to
retirement behavior. The conversion factor then depends largely on the fixed
term m0 and does not compensate sufficiently in terms of pension supplements
p′ received for the prolonged contribution and shorter retirement periods.
This, in turn, magnifies the imbalance between the marginal returns and costs
of postponing retirement, implying that the participation tax increases with the
retirement date, i.e., τ ′R > 0. Correspondingly, the participation tax declines
when agents retire earlier. The reduction in τR tends, of course, to encourage
later retirement, but cannot offset the trend to early retirement from the
original preference shock.
15Observe, however, that an explicit consolidation is necessary only when the system is actuarially
unfair in the sense of Gruber and Wise and features a positive τR. An actuarially fair system
with τR = 0 consolidates automatically, since earlier retirement reduces the conversion factor,
reflecting the resulting longer retirement and shorter contribution periods.
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Irrespective of whether the system includes an actuarially fair adjustment
for changes in the length of the retirement period, we find, interestingly,
that early retirement raises intensive labor supply of younger workers. Using
Eqs. 9–11, we obtain:
τˆL = τm0x
(1 − τL) R · xˆ < 0 ⇒ Lˆ = −σ · τˆL > 0. (23)
The intuition is best understood by reference to the Bismarckian system with a
fixed conversion factor, m = m0. When the retirement date is moved forward,
contribution payments yield pension gains earlier in life and over a longer
retirement period. The implicit tax defined in Eq. 6 thus falls, stimulating
intensive labor supply. Moreover, even if the conversion factor m includes
an actuarial component, the implicit tax on the young falls, as long as the
reduction in the conversion factor is insufficiently great.16
3 Efficiency of public pensions
3.1 Welfare measure
To judge the efficiency of pension systems, we need a consistent welfare metric.
To this end, we use the PAYG budgets in Eq. 19 to restate indirect utility of
all three generations:
V0 = p0/R = τ L/R,
V = (1 − τ) L − ϕ (L) + [x (1 − τ) + (1 − x) p − γφ (x)] /R, (24)
V f = (1 − τ) = (1 − τ) + τ · (1 + x) − (1 − x) p.
The utilitarian social welfare function, also employed by Calvo and Obstfeld
(1988), is the discounted sum of individual utilities:
 = RV0 + V + V f /R = L − ϕ (L) + 1
R
[1 + x − γφ (x)] , (25)
where the second equality follows upon substituting Eq. 19. This welfare
function exclusively reflects economic efficiency and does not incorporate
distributional concerns.17
Given that intensive and extensive labor supply are the only behavioral
margins, the welfare effects of pension policy must be proportional to changes
16The implicit tax rate on intensive labor supply is independent of retirement behavior only if
the conversion factor depends exclusively on retirement duration, i.e., m0 = 0 and m = α/ (1 − x)
imply a constant τL = τ (1 − α/R).
17This is less restrictive than it seems. As in Keuschnigg (1994), we can analytically separate
efficiency from intergenerational redistribution. In Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000), this decom-
position is used to construct an (ex ante) Pareto-improving reform.
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in x and L. Taking the differential of Eq. 25, substituting for the private choices
of work effort and retirement in Eqs. 6 and 12, and letting W = 1, we find:
d = [1 − ϕ′ (L)] · dL + 1 − γφ
′ (x)
R
· dx = τL · dL + τRR · dx. (26)
Note that the coefficients on dL and dx for the change in welfare d reflect
the differences between the social and private returns of a marginal increase in
hours worked, 1 vs 1 − τL, and in the retirement date, 1 vs 1 − τR. Substituting
for Lˆ and xˆ from Eqs. 9 and 13 (and holding γˆ = 0), the welfare effects become:
d = τL L · Lˆ + τRxR · xˆ = −τL · σ L · τˆL − τR · η
x
R
· τˆR. (27)
The welfare impact of any behavioral changes induced by pension reform is,
to the first order, proportional to the effective tax rates on work effort and
old-age participation. The pension system is the only source of inefficiency in
our simple framework. If it were absent, allocation would be Pareto optimal.
Introducing small contributions and pension entitlements would, to the first
order, entail a zero marginal welfare impact.
3.2 Higher statutory tax rate
To study the labor market and efficiency effects of PAYG pensions, we first
consider an increase in the statutory contribution rate τ . Since the analysis of
the general case is quite complex, we concentrate on three specific scenarios
to bring out the main message of our analysis. First, we consider complete
actuarial fairness in the sense that the system adjusts the earnings-linked
pension to take into account the length of the retirement period. This case
emphasizes that, while actuarial adjustment in the sense of Gruber and Wise
eliminates the distortion in the retirement date, it is insufficient to ensure
complete labor market neutrality of the pension system. The second scenario
assumes a fixed labor supply of younger workers and incomplete actuarial
adjustment in the pension formula. Here, we show that a Bismarckian system
with a fixed tax–benefit link mitigates, but does not remove, the distortion in
the retirement decision. The third scenario entirely eliminates any tax–benefit
link and considers the labor market impact of flat pensions unrelated to past
earnings. The succeeding section will then characterize the excess burden when
the labor market is distorted both on the intensive and extensive margins.
Actuarial fairness A number of countries have reformed their earnings-linked
PAYG systems by including pension supplements in the sense of Gruber and
Wise to compensate for postponed retirement. If the pension rule is made
sufficiently sensitive to the choice of retirement date and adjusts the conversion
factor in an actuarially fair way to reflect the longer contribution period
and the shorter length of the remaining retirement period, all distortions
with regard to labor market participation of older people can be eliminated.
In our simple framework, this calls for a conversion factor in Eq. 4 equal
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to m (x) = 1/ (1 − x) with α = 1 and m0 = 0. In this case, (1 − x) m′ = m.
Since it implies  = 0, we find from Eq. 57 in the Appendix that the direct
effect of the contribution rate, for any given retirement date x, on the par-
ticipation tax rate is zero, ∂τR/∂τ = 0. To understand why, one must note
that the fair conversion factor (1 − x) m = 1 eliminates any sensitivity of the
implicit tax rate τL with respect to the retirement date so that intensive labor
supply of younger workers becomes independent of the retirement decision.
Consequently, the sensitivity of the assessment base z = L + x with respect
to retirement reduces to the retirement margin only, z′ = 1 (which obviously
implies ∂z′/∂τ = 0). The increase in the assessment base z′ on account of a
longer contribution period and any direct impact ∂z/∂τ of the first-period
labor supply response on the assessment base are fully translated into an
adjustment of the pension size so that the effective retirement tax is unaffected.
Using, in Eq. 55, the fact that a fair system is characterized by (1 − x) m′ = m,
(1 − x) m = z′ = 1, and ∂z′/∂τ = 0, and substituting into Eq. 53, indeed proves
∂τR/∂τ = 0.
However, this does not mean that such a system does not influence the
retirement date. The level of the participation tax rate is positive as long
as there is a flat, lump-sum pension, τR = b . To see this, note the pension
formula p = mτz + b , with p′ = τ [m′z + mz′]. Using z′ = 1, (1 − x) m′ = m,
and (1 − x) m = 1 in Eq. 12 confirms the result. If the higher contribution rate
raises extra revenues beyond what is needed to pay for the higher earnings-
linked pensions, the flat pension b becomes more generous, which, in turn,
raises the participation tax rate and leads to earlier retirement.
The extent of the tax revenue increase depends, of course, also on the
resulting intensive labor supply response. Even if the system is actuarially fair
with respect to the retirement date, the implicit tax rate on young workers is
still positive, τL = τ · (1 − 1/R) > 0, since an unfunded system does not pay in-
terest on accumulated contributions. An increase in the statutory contribution
rate thus raises the effective tax component on contributions and discourages
intensive labor supply. To verify these statements, we solve the system stated
in Eqs. 50 and 52. Since z′ = 1 and m0 = z′′ = 0 in the present scenario, we
have τ ′R = 0 in Eq. 16, which eliminates the elasticity ε from the resulting
expressions. Together with ∂τR/∂τ = 0, the system reduces to:
xˆ = − η
1 − τR · db , db =
τRx
1 − x · xˆ +
[
b
τ
+ τL
1 − τL σmL
]
· dτ, (28)
where the terms in square brackets replace the one in Eq. 52. To see this,
note that the PAYG budget in Eq. 19 and the pension formula imply 1+x1−x =
p/τ = mz + b/τ . Using this expression and combining with Eqs. 54–55 yields
the square brackets in Eq. 28.
The resulting solution can be illustrated using Fig. 1. In contrast to the case
of a trend toward early retirement, the budget line shifts up in response to
the rise in τ , while the position of the retirement locus remains unchanged.
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Consequently, agents retire earlier, and the system affords a more gener-
ous flat pension component. The comparative static solution, using Eq. 28,
corresponds to:18
xˆ = − η
1 − τR
1
∇
[
b
τ
+ τL
1 − τL σmL
]
· dτ < 0,
db = 1∇
[
b
τ
+ τL
1 − τL σmL
]
· dτ > 0,
∇ = 1 + τR
1 − τR
x
1 − xη.
(29)
We have thus seen that expanding the system with an actuarially fair
adjustment of the conversion factor not only pays for a more generous
earnings-linked pension but also for a higher flat pension. The latter effect
raises the participation tax rate and results in early retirement. In addition,
the implicit tax rate on the young τL = τ · (1 − 1/R) increases because the
adjustment of the conversion factor cannot undo the fact that contributions
in an unfunded system pay no interest and, thus, partly represent a tax on
the young that distorts intensive labor supply, Lˆ = −σ · τˆL < 0. According to
Eq. 27, aggregate welfare declines on both margins. The welfare loss would be
zero on the extensive retirement margin if, in the initial equilibrium, the flat
pension and, thus, the participation tax rate were zero: τR = b = 0.
Fixed labor supply of young workers When labor supply is completely in-
sensitive to variations in effective wages (σ = 0), the pension assessment base
z = L + x depends only on changes in the retirement date (z′ = 1), so that
∂z/∂τ = ∂z′/∂τ = 0. In evaluating the impact of the statutory contribution rate
on the participation tax rate, we find from Eqs. 53–57
∂τR/∂τ = 1 − α + m0 [z − (1 − x)] ≥ 0. (30)
We assume in this scenario that the conversion factor m is “imperfectly” fair—
as it in fact is in most countries—and allow for arbitrary parameter values α ∈
[0, 1] and m0.19 If the conversion factor were fair, α = 1 and m0 = 0, a higher
contribution rate would not affect the participation tax rate.
We now solve for the equilibrium impact of the policy change. With
fixed labor supply, ∂p/∂τ = mz. The PAYG budget constraint Eq. 19 im-
plies (1 + x) / (1 − x) = p/τ while the pension formula is rearranged to yield
mz = (p − b) /τ . Substituting this expression into the term square brack-
ets in Eq. 52, the equilibrium system Eqs. 50 and 52 simplifies to xˆ =
18Table 1 gives the qualitative responses of (τˆR, xˆ, τˆL, Lˆ, db) to an increase in τ under actuarial
fairness, together with the responses to the policy scenarios considered in Section 4.
19With z′ = 1, Eqs. 12 and 15 imply τR = b + τ [1 − α + m0 (z − (1 − x))]. The second term shows
how the earnings-linked pension leads to a positive participation tax rate. If it were positive and,
thus, unfair initially, then the participation tax will increase with a higher contribution rate.
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Table 1 Qualitative
responses under alternative
policy reforms
dτ > 0 dm0 > 0 dα > 0 dα|m=m¯ > 0
τˆR (+) (−) (−) (−)
xˆ (−) (+) (+) (+)
τˆL (+) (−) (−) 0
Lˆ (−) (+) (+) 0
db (+) (−) (−) (+)
− η1+ηε 11−τR
[
db + ∂τR
∂τ
· dτ ] and db = τRx1−x · xˆ + bτ · dτ . Noting the definition of
∇ in Eq. 21, the corresponding solution is
xˆ = − 1
1 − τR
η
1 + ηε
1
∇
(
b
τ
+ ∂τR
∂τ
)
· dτ < 0,
db = − 1∇
[
τR
1 − τR
x
1 − x
η
1 + ηε
∂τR
∂τ
− b
τ
]
· dτ.
(31)
The interpretation is of Eq. 31 straightforward. If the system is unfair with
respect to the length of remaining retirement, as in the standard Bismarckian
system with a fixed tax–benefit link m0, the agent loses when retiring an
instant later. The net effect of the extra contribution plus pension foregone
minus the present value of the increase in future pensions reflects a positive
participation tax. The loss on the extensive margin induces agents to retire
earlier, thereby worsening the system’s budgetary position. Consequently, the
retirement date declines and the flat pension is reduced to keep the system
sustainable (if b is not too large initially). As a check on consistency, a
fair system would involve p = mτz with b = 0 and m = 1/ (1 − x), implying
∂τR/∂τ = 0, as argued above. There would then be no effect on the retirement
date.20 Given the impact on retirement, the implication for economic efficiency
in Eq. 27 is also clear. In sum, with a positive participation tax, retirement
already occurs inefficiently early, so that an expansion of the system can only
reinforce this distortion and lead to further efficiency losses.
Flat pensions If pensions are lump-sum from an individual’s perspective and
completely unrelated to past earnings, then labor market distortions are at
their highest. The absence of a tax–benefit link is given by α = m0 = m = 0,
reducing the pension formula to p = b . The effective tax rates on the intensive
labor supply of younger workers and on the participation of their older coun-
terparts are τL = τ and τR = τ + p, respectively. Clearly, the participation tax
rate is independent of the retirement date, implying τ ′R = ε = 0. The absence
of a tax–benefit link also implies ∂p/∂τ = 0 and, of course, ∂τR/∂τ = 1. In
20The system would still redistribute intergenerationally, an issue that we do not analyze here.
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this case, the system in Eqs. 50 and 52 reduces to xˆ = − η1−τR
[
db + dτ ] and
db = τRx1−x · xˆ + 1+x1−x · dτ , yielding a solution
xˆ = −η · τˆR = −η ·
[
1 + x
1 − x + 1
]
· dτ∇(1 − τR) < 0,
db =
[
1 + x
1 − x −
τR
1 − τR
x
1 − xη
]
· dτ∇ > 0,
∇ ≡ 1 + τR
1 − τR
x
1 − xη > 0.
(32)
An increased contribution rate in a system without a tax–benefit link leads to
earlier retirement and more generous flat pensions. The pension level grows
less than proportionally because earlier retirement erodes the tax base, de-
pending on the magnitude of the participation distortion τR and the extensive
elasticity η. The increase in the effective tax rate τL = τ also reduces first-
period labor supply and the welfare of young workers.
3.3 Excess burden
This subsection provides a sharp characterization of the efficiency loss from
expanding a PAYG pension system without a tax–benefit link. The absence
of a tax–benefit link and the assumption of intertemporally separable prefer-
ences imply that pension budgets and labor market behavior can be analyzed
independently in each period without any spillover. Although special, this case
allows for a particularly simple and illuminating characterization of the excess
burden from lump-sum PAYG pensions. Intensive labor supply L occurs in the
first period and depends only on the first-period tax rate τ1, while retirement
behavior refers to the second period and depends exclusively on the second
period tax rate τ2. In this case, τL = τ1 leads to an intensive labor supply
response in the first period equal to Lˆ = −σ · τˆ1. Substituting this together with
Eq. 32 into Eq. 27 yields:
d = − τL
1 − τL σ L · dτ1 −
τR
1 − τR η ·
2x
∇ R(1 − x) · dτ2. (33)
Clearly, a permanent increase in contribution financed flat pensions (dτ1 =
dτ2) reduces aggregate welfare on both the intensive and extensive margins
of labor supply.
We now develop a metric to evaluate the marginal excess burden of a tax,
which is defined as the marginal loss in welfare in percent of net tax revenue
raised at the margin. Using the budget relationships in Eq. 19 for a flat pension
system, we write the intertemporal budget constraint as:
T ≡ τ1 L + (τ2 + p) · xR = p
0 + p − τ2
R
. (34)
In measuring the excess burden of a PAYG system, we must take care of the
overall impact of the behavioral response on the public budget. Not only the
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tax τ2 but also the spending p distorts labor market participation of older
workers. A policy-induced trend to early retirement erodes the contribution
tax base and also generates extra pension claims. For this reason, the change
in contribution revenues would capture only a, perhaps relatively unimportant,
part of the overall fiscal cost of early retirement. We thus need to consider
the participation tax revenue in the second period, equal to (τ2 + p) x = τRx.
It measures the total fiscal gain when labor market participation is increased
from zero to x and consists of contribution payments plus savings on pension
spending. The meaning of this definition is also seen from the budget in Eq. 1,
C2 = RS + x + p − τRx. If there were no participation at all, pension spending
would have been p. When retirement is postponed by x, the individual pays
extra contributions and foregoes pensions over this time interval, which adds
up to a total loss τRx. The public budget improves by the same amount. This
“participation tax revenue” (τ2 + p) x = p − τ2 is equal to maximum pension
spending p, reduced by the contribution τ2 from the future generation.
With lump-sum pensions, τR = τ2 + p and τL = τ1. Using the retirement
response to an increase in contribution-financed flat pensions in Eq. 32, as well
as xˆ = −ητˆR, yields the total impact on the present value of the PAYG budget:
dT =
[
1 − τL
1 − τL σ
]
· Ldτ1 +
[
1 − τR
1 − τR η
]
· x
1 − x
2
∇ Rdτ2. (35)
According to Eq. 35, the present value of the budget impact depends on the
size of the induced labor supply response on both the intensive and extensive
margins.
The marginal excess burden is defined as the marginal, income equivalent
welfare loss per additional unit of net tax revenue raised, expressed in present
value over all periods. Using Eqs. 33 and 35, we obtain:
 ≡ −d
dT
=
τL
1 − τL σ · ωL +
τR
1 − τR η · ωx
1 − τL
1 − τL σ · ωL −
τR
1 − τR η · ωx
, (36)
where weights ωL ≡ L/
[
L + x1−x 2∇ R
]
and ωx ≡ x1−x 2∇ R/
[
L + x1−x 2∇ R
]
indicate
the relative importance of the intensive and extensive margins, such that ωL +
ωx = 1. Moreover, the marginal cost of public funds is one plus the marginal
excess burden:
MCPF = 1 +  = 1
1 − τL
1 − τL σ · ωL −
τR
1 − τR η · ωx
. (37)
In raising the contribution rate to pay for a pension rise, this policy causes
people to choose early retirement. Each unit of earlier retirement causes a
double burden on the fiscal budget equal to the participation tax rate. The
general structure of the MCPF formula in Eq. 37 is parallel to that found in
Kleven and Kreiner (2006), who also considered the welfare consequences
of tax and benefit changes in a static model, and Immervoll et al. (2007).
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Their analyses are applied here with appropriate modifications to characterize
the excess burden of public pensions. The excess burden with respect to the
retirement decision is driven by the measures of the participation tax rate,
or implicit retirement tax, as suggested by Gruber and Wise (1999b, 2005).
The relevant retirement elasticity for Germany is estimated by Börsch-Supan
(2000).
4 Parametric pension reform
4.1 Stronger tax–benefit link
Many countries recently reformed their PAYG pension systems. To undo
some of their damaging labor market effects and, in particular, to raise the
average retirement age, policy makers have aimed primarily at strengthening
the tax–benefit link and introducing a greater degree of actuarial fairness. For
example, in order to strengthen old-age labor market participation, Austria
has introduced substantial supplements to regular pensions when work is
continued beyond the statutory retirement age and pension discounts, or
“penalties,” for early retirement. Further, the length of the calculation period
has been significantly prolonged, i.e., the number of years of past earnings that
count towards future pensions has been increased. In addition, the pension
system was harmonized so that some occupational groups, such as civil servants
who previously received pensions largely unrelated to past earnings, have been
integrated into the same earnings-linked system. These measures represent
different ways of strengthening the tax–benefit link by making it more wide-
spread, thereby reducing the importance of flat lump-sum pensions.21
Within our simple framework, we can analyze this policy initiative by
considering an increase in the fixed component m0 of the conversion factor
m = α/ (1 − x) + m0. To avoid complex calculations that yield no additional
insights, we set m0 = 0 in the initial equilibrium and allow α ∈ [0, 1]. Since
this clearly raises earnings-linked pension levels, we endogenously cut the
lump-sum pension component b to satisfy the PAYG budget constraint when
the statutory contribution rate is kept constant. In Appendix B, we compute
(see Eqs. 58–62) the partial effects on the size of the earnings-linked pension
and the participation tax rate. Among other results, we find that an increased
conversion factor directly raises the pension level. It also lowers the effective
tax rate τL of young workers because they individually expect larger future
pensions when working more. This stimulates labor supply, augments the
assessment base, and further raises pension size. However, a larger pension
raises the participation tax rate τR. On the other hand, this incentive for early
21See Knell et al. (2006) for an informative description of pension reform in Austria. Fehr et al.
(2003) study, by means of numerical simulations of the Norwegian economy, the implications of
reforms that reduce the importance of the nonactuarial component of pensions.
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Fig. 2 Tighter tax–benefit
link
b
x
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retirement is mitigated by the fact that the policy measure also raises the
pension supplement p that becomes available upon choosing a marginally
higher retirement age. It must be kept in mind, nevertheless, that the flat
pension is endogenously cut to sustain the PAYG budget, which, in turn,
causes people retire later. To verify our logic, we solve the system Eqs. 50
and 52, starting from a position of m0 = 0, and noting τ ′R = ε = 0:
xˆ = η ·
[
∂p
∂m0
− ∂τR
∂m0
]
1
∇
dm0
1 − τR > 0,
db = −
[
τR
1 − τR
x
1 − xη
∂τR
∂m0
+ ∂p
∂m0
]
1
∇ dm0 < 0,
(38)
where ∇ > 0 is given in Eq. 21. The signs of the comparative static effects
depends on signs of the terms in square brackets in Eq. 38. Employing the
appropriate partial derivative expressions stated in Appendix B, we obtain:
∂p
∂m0
− ∂τR
∂m0
= τ
[
(1 − x) + τ − τL
1 − τL · σ L
]
> 0. (39)
Hence, a tighter tax–benefit link raises the retirement age, xˆ > 0, and reduces
the lump-sum pension level, db < 0. In addition, the partial derivatives in
Eqs. 59–62 imply ∂τR/∂m0 > 0 and ∂p/∂m0 > 0. Moreover, the lump-sum
pension falls to such an extent that in equilibrium, despite of the direct effect
∂τR/∂m0 > 0, the participation tax rate declines, which increases x. Figure 2
illustrates the response to the reform.22
22The third column of Table 1 shows the responses of the effective tax rates, labor supply decisions,
and flat pensions to an increase in m0.
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Noting the pension formula Eq. 14 and taking the differential of Eq. 12,
with ε = 0 due to m0 = 0 initially, yields the equilibrium response of the
participation tax:
τˆR = ∂p
∂m0
· dm0
1 − τR +
db
1 − τR − (1 − x)
∂p′
∂m0
· dm0
1 − τR < 0. (40)
Substituting the equilibrium changes of retirement age and lump-sum pensions
as noted in Eq. 38 and using the partial effects stated in Eq. 39 and Appendix B,
we find, after some lengthy computations, xˆ = −η · τˆR > 0, with xˆ > 0 as in
Eq. 38. This reflects the fact that all retirement incentives are summarized in
the participation tax rate.
The intensive labor supply response of young workers, Lˆ = −σ ·
τˆL, depends on the equilibrium change of the implicit tax rate τL =
τ
[
1 − (1 − x) m/R]. Since the statutory contribution rate remains constant,
the log-differential yields
τˆL = − (1 − x) τ/R1 − τL · dm0, (41)
which implies that the tax–benefit link reduces the implicit tax rate on young
workers, thereby stimulating intensive labor supply. Under the conditions
stated above, a stronger tax–benefit link reduces the effective tax rates on both
margins of aggregate labor supply, leading, according to Eq. 27, to (potentially)
substantial welfare gains.
4.2 Greater actuarial fairness
We next explore the benefits of introducing a greater degree of actuarial
fairness. Specifically, we first consider the effects of strengthening the tax–
benefit link by raising the conversion factor so that pension earnings are more
sensitive to the retirement date. The scenario, thus, involves an increase in the
parameter α, where the conversion factor is m = α/ (1 − x), with m0 = 0. To
keep the system sustainable when past earnings translate into more generous
pensions, the lump-sum pension must be cut. We calculate in the Appendix,
using Eqs. 63–66, the partial effects for any given retirement date x and
find that the participation tax rate is reduced by23 ∂τR/∂α = −τ , while the
23In the specific case considered here, we can obtain a closed form solution: since z′ = 1, we
have p′ = τ [m + m′z]. Using τR = τ + p − (1 − x) p′ and (1 − x) m′ = m, we then derive τR =
b + (1 − α) τ .
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earnings-linked pension component becomes larger, ∂p/∂α > 0. Solving
Eqs. 50 and 52 yields:24
xˆ = η · τ + ∂p/∂α∇ ·
dα
1 − τR > 0,
db = −
[(
1 + τ − τL
1 − τL σ
)
L +
(
1 − τR
1 − τR η
)
x
]
τ
(1 − x)∇ · dα,
(42)
which imply an increase in the retirement date, xˆ > 0. If the earnings-linked
component becomes larger, the lump-sum pension must be cut, db < 0, except
for extreme cases.25 Moreover, the policy change is strictly welfare improv-
ing. Since ε = 0, the participation tax rate changes by τˆR = ∂p∂α dα1−τR + db1−τR −
(1 − x) ∂p′
∂α
dα
1−τR . As before, substituting the solutions from Eq. 42 yields, after
some manipulations, the result satisfying xˆ = −η · τˆR. The rise in α also leads to
a decline in the implicit tax rate on younger workers. The results with respect
to the effective tax rates are summarized as follows:
τˆR = −τ + ∂p/∂α∇ ·
dα
1 − τR < 0, τˆL = −
τ
R
· dα
1 − τL < 0. (43)
Since both effective tax rates fall, aggregate labor supply on the intensive and
extensive margins is stimulated. Depending on the magnitude of the initial
labor market distortions, aggregate efficiency improves.
The scenario discussed above not only introduces more actuarial fairness
but also makes earnings-linked pensions more generous, since it raises the
conversion factor. To a large extent, however, recent pension reform policy
is dictated by the need to restore fiscal sustainability, a goal hardly compatible
with replacing a greater part of past earnings. To consider situations closer to
actual policy challenges, we evaluate the following reform scenario: raise the
parameter α to introduce more actuarial fairness and at the same time cut the
coefficient m0 to prevent pensions from becoming more generous:
dm0 = − dα1 − x ⇒ dm =
m
1 − x · dx. (44)
The scenario implies that the conversion factor m = α/ (1 − x) + m0 re-
mains constant, m = m¯, for any given retirement behavior. The conversion fac-
tor increases only if the policy measure leads workers to postpone retirement.
To keep calculations simple, we start from an initial situation of m0 = 0 so that
m′ = m/ (1 − x).26
24If the coefficient m0 = 0 so that (1 − x) m′ = m, the following restrictions can be used: z′ = 1
and  = 0 = z′′, hence, τ ′R = ε = 0, as well as ∂τR/∂α = −τ . From Eq. 65, we obtain (1 − x) ∂p
′
∂α
=
τ + τ
[
z
1−x + m ∂z∂α
]
= τ + ∂p
∂α
, where ∂p
∂α
= τ1−x
(
z + τ−τL1−τL σ L
)
and τ − τL = ατ/R.
25A limited countervailing effect arises, since the pension is paid over a shorter period, which
allows the possibility of a larger pension, when retirement is postponed.
26Strictly speaking, m0 < 0 after the policy change, to offset the increase in m due to a higher α.
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To derive the comparative static effects and the welfare consequences of
this policy experiment, we need to determine the partial effects on pensions
p, the participation tax rate τR, and the pension supplement p′. To do so, we
impose the policy change dm0 = − dα1−x and evaluate derivatives at the initial
position m0 = 0 and m = α/ (1 − x). Using Eqs. 59 and 60 and Eqs. 64 and 65,
as well as (1 − x) mτ/R = τ − τL from the definition of the effective tax rate,
we show that the partial effects on pension earnings completely cancel. The
result is due to the fact that the policy initiative, for a given retirement date,
holds the conversion factor constant:
∂p
∂α
dα + ∂p
∂m0
dm0 =
[
(1 − x) ∂p
∂α
− ∂p
∂m0
]
· dα
1 − x = 0,
∂τR
∂α
dα + ∂τR
∂m0
dm0 =
[
(1 − x) ∂τR
∂α
− ∂τR
∂m0
]
· dα
1 − x = −τz ·
dα
1 − x < 0,
∂p′
∂α
dα + ∂p
′
∂m0
dm0 =
[
(1 − x) ∂p
′
∂α
− ∂p
′
∂m0
]
· dα
1 − x =
τz
1 − x ·
dα
1 − x > 0.
(45)
The partial effect on the participation tax rate follows upon substituting Eqs. 62
and 66 and is negative: greater actuarial fairness is designed to reduce the
participation tax and to induce postponed retirement. To achieve this, the
government increases the pension supplement p′ that becomes available for
a marginal delay in retirement.
The equilibrium impact of the policy reform is found, as before, by solving
the system Eqs. 50 and 52. Using the results given above and noting τ ′R = ε = 0
if evaluated at m0 = 0, we calculate:
xˆ = η · 1
1 − τR
τz
∇ ·
dα
1 − x > 0, db = η ·
τR
1 − τR
x
1 − x
τz
∇ ·
dα
1 − x > 0, (46)
where ∇ ≡ 1 + τR1−τR x1−xη > 0. As indicated, the policy experiment in Eq. 44
keeps pension size fixed if the retirement date does not change but offers
larger pension supplements when retirement is postponed. It thus succeeds to
reduce the participation tax and to encourage later retirement. This scenario
also raises the lump-sum pension b—in sharp contrast to the previous case
in which the conversion factor m was allowed to vary—since it expands the
assessment base and shortens the retirement period.27
27The fourth and fifth columns of Table 1 list, respectively, the qualitative responses of implicit
taxes, intensive and extensive labor supply, and flat pensions to greater actuarial fairness under
the scenario in which the conversion factor is allowed to adjust and the one in which it held fixed,
i.e., m = m¯.
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In equilibrium, with ε = 0, the effect of retirement choice x on τR disap-
pears. Substitution of Eq. 45 shows that the participation tax rate falls by:
τˆR = − τz
(1 − τR)∇ ·
dα
1 − x < 0, (47)
which confirms xˆ = −η · τˆR and is consistent with Eq. 46. A welfare evaluation
employing Eq. 27 requires the calculation of the effect on the effective tax
rate on young workers and their intensive labor supply response. Imposing
the policy change and calculating the differential of the implicit tax rate τL =
τ
[
1 − (1 − x) m/R] at m0 = 0 yields:
dτL = τR ·
[
mdx − (1 − x) dm] = 0. (48)
According to Eq. 48, the effective tax rate on young workers is independent of
the policy scenario in Eq. 44, implying that first-period labor supply remains
constant. The experiment fails to reduce distortions faced by young workers
and, thus, cannot promise any further efficiency gains on that margin. The main
advantage of the policy package is the reduction of the participation tax rate.
By encouraging later retirement, it potentially results in welfare gains on the
extensive margin.
5 Conclusion
The potential labor market impact of pension reform is a prime policy concern.
Aging and the socioeconomic trend to early retirement not only impose
financial stress on the system, but are also an important factor in restraining
aggregate employment. The need to provide incentives for continued labor
market participation of older workers has, thus, received increasing attention
among policy makers. For example, the tax character and the harmful impact
on labor supply incentives of prime-age workers is a particular concern. Recent
reform initiatives in many countries also aim at reducing the large participation
tax rates incorporated in current pension systems. Pension formulas have
been modified to offer income supplements for each year of delayed retire-
ment and pension “penalties” have been imposed when earlier retirement is
chosen. Other measures seek to improve incentives of prime-age workers by
strengthening the tax–benefit link. In Austria, recent pension reform includes
a “harmonization” of the system, with the consequence that civil servants and
other groups who have previously received lump-sum pensions unrelated to
past earnings, are now included in the same earnings-linked pension system.
Moreover, Austria, along with other countries, has lengthened the calculation
period for the pension assessment base so that not only the best 5 or 10 years,
but the entire earnings history matters in determining the size of the pension.
The purpose is to raise the share of prime-age workers who are subject to a
tax–benefit link and will, as a result, perceive that their pension contributions
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have a lower tax component. As such, these reforms are suitable to stimulate
labor supply and employment among younger workers.
This paper has proposed a simple model that captures the interaction
between labor supply incentives of prime-age workers and incentives for labor
market participation of those near retirement. We show that the joint policy
goals of stimulating young and old-age labor supply can conflict with each
other. In a system with a tax–benefit link, raising the retirement age tends to
raise the effective tax faced by young, prime-age workers. When the retirement
date is postponed, the extra pension benefits expected by a young worker from
increased earnings are obtained only in the more distant future and over a
shorter retirement period. Consequently, these future earnings are discounted
more heavily, which raises the tax component of any given contribution. For
the same reasons, we find that an exogenous, socioeconomic trend to early
retirement raises prime-age labor supply, which tends to offset the reduction
in aggregate employment due to lower old-age labor market participation. In
view of this trade-off, policy makers should be careful to design reforms in a
way that strengthens both margins of labor supply in an aging society.
Fortunately, our analysis shows that some recent reform approaches can
attain this objective. If it is possible to cut lump-sum pensions, for example,
by “harmonizing” the system, an increase in the tax–benefit link indeed tends
to stimulate both margins of labor supply, regardless of whether the link is
also made actuarially fair with respect to the retirement date. However, if
the conversion factor determining pension size conditional on past earnings
is made more sensitive with respect to retirement age without raising its
overall magnitude, then such a reform, while encouraging old-age labor mar-
ket participation, does not stimulate employment among prime-age workers.
Nevertheless, this scenario shows that any given increase in the tax–benefit link
is much preferred if it is also made actuarially fair in the sense of Gruber and
Wise, compared to one that is not sensitive to a worker’s retirement choice.
Appendix
A Comparative statics
In part A of the Appendix, we calculate the log-linearized versions of the
retirement condition Eq. 12 and the PAYG pension budget Eq. 19. The
resulting expressions take into account, subject to pension earnings Eq. 14,
the intensive labor supply decision Eq. 11, and solve—in terms of percentage
changes relative to an initial equilibrium—for the equilibrium retirement date
x and flat pension b . They serve as the basis for our comparative statics analysis
in Sections 2, 3, and 4.
To begin, we note that pension earnings are a complex function of the para-
meters of the PAYG system: p (x, b ; τ, m0, α)=m (x; m0, α)τz(x; τ, m0, α)+b .
Obviously, p′ ≡ ∂p/∂x is independent of the flat pension b . We derive how
the relative change τˆR ≡ dτR/ (1 − τR) of the participation tax rate depends
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on changes in retirement behavior, x, and pension parameters τ , m0, α, and
b . The effective tax rate τR ≡ τ + p − (1 − x)p′ is defined in Eq. 12. Defining
the elasticity ε ≡ τ ′Rx/ (1 − τR), where τ ′R is given in Eq. 16, and noting that
pension parameters affect the participation tax rate by their impact on p and
p′, we obtain:
τˆR = ε · xˆ + db1 − τR +
∂τR
∂τ
dτ
1 − τR +
∂τR
∂m0
dm0
1 − τR +
∂τR
∂α
dα
1 − τR . (49)
The derivatives of τR will be derived for specific policy scenarios in part B
of the Appendix. Substituting Eq. 49 into the retirement response noted in
Eq. 13, we derive, after rearranging, the following equation for the impact on
retirement in terms of parametric shifts and the change db in the endogenous
level of flat pensions:
xˆ = − η
1 + ηε
1
1 − τR
[
db + ∂τR
∂τ
dτ + ∂τR
∂m0
dm0 + ∂τR
∂α
dα + (1 − τR) γˆ
]
. (50)
This equation corresponds to the retirement locus in Figs. 1 and 2. It is down-
ward sloping, since a higher flat pension induces, holding τ, m0, α constant,
earlier retirement.
The other constraint that pins down the equilibrium is the condition for
budget balance in Eq. 19: τ · (1 + x) = (1 − x) p. Taking the differential of
revenues and spending yields:
(1 + x) dτ + τdx = (1 − x)
[
p′dx + ∂p
∂τ
dτ + ∂p
∂m0
dm0 + ∂p
∂α
dα + db
]
− pdx.
(51)
Using the fact that τR = τ + p − (1 − x) p′, we solve for db in terms of xˆ and
the shifts in the pension parameters:
db = τRx
1 − x · xˆ +
[
1 + x
1 − x −
∂p
∂τ
]
· dτ − ∂p
∂m0
· dm0 − ∂p
∂α
· dα. (52)
This equation corresponds to the PAYG budget locus in Figs. 1 and 2. It
is upward sloping since an increase in retirement age relaxes the pension
budget and allows for a larger flat pension as long as the participation tax
rate τR is positive. This is intuitive, since the participation tax measures the
net fiscal loss to households and, thus, the net gain to the system, if retirement
is marginally postponed. The tax rate τR captures the extra tax paid plus the
pension earnings foregone minus the increase in pensions over the remaining
life-time 1 − x, corresponding to the number of pensioners in the cross-section
of the population.
The solution of Eqs. 50 and 52 determines the reduced-form, equilibrium
expressions for the retirement response and the size of the flat, lump-sum
pension payments in terms of the changes in the system parameters (τ, m0, α)
and the preference parameter γ. This solution yields, in turn, the reactions
Pension reform and labor market incentives 797
of the other variables of interest, e.g., the response of intensive labor supply
Lˆ of young workers, the latter due, as discussed above in Eqs. 10 and 11, to
the impact of the participation decision xˆ on the implicit tax τˆL. We can also
infer the impact on the participation tax τˆR of the old, which yields the welfare
change according to Eq. 27.
B Effects on the participation tax rate
In Appendix B, we derive the responses of the participation tax to changes in,
respectively, the contribution rate, the tax–benefit link, and the degree of actu-
arial fairness. Combined with Eqs. 50 and 52, the resulting partial derivatives
determine the equilibrium shifts in old-age participation and flat pensions for
the policy reforms considered in Sections 3 and 4. All the subsequent partial
derivatives are calculated for a given retirement date.
Statutory tax rate Using τR = τ + p − (1 − x) p′ from Eq. 12, we compute first
the effect of an increase in the contribution rate:
∂τR
∂τ
= 1 + ∂p
∂τ
− (1 − x) ∂p
′
∂τ
. (53)
The impact on earnings-linked pensions depends on the reaction of the assess-
ment base, z = x + L, which, in turn, is driven by first-period labor supply in
Eq. 9. Using τL as given in Eq. 6 and holding x constant, we find that a higher
contribution rate discourages intensive labor supply and thereby erodes the
assessment base:
τ
∂z
∂τ
= τ ∂L
∂τL
∂τL
∂τ
= − τL
1 − τL · σ L < 0. (54)
In calculating the effect on pensions p = mτz + b , we note that the con-
version factor m = α1−x + m0 and its derivative m′ = α(1−x)2 = m−m01−x are inde-
pendent of τ . A higher contribution rate thus affects the pension level and
the pension increment p′ = τ · [zm′ + mz′] that is offered if retirement is
marginally postponed:
∂p
∂τ
= m
[
z + τ ∂z
∂τ
]
,
∂p′
∂τ
= m
[
z′ + τ ∂z
′
∂τ
]
+ m′
[
z + τ ∂z
∂τ
]
. (55)
The term z′ = 1 + L′ = 1 − , with  ≡ σ L1−τL · m0τR , follows from Eq. 11.28
Assuming a fixed wage elasticity of labor supply σ , we obtain:
τ · dz
′
dτ
= − ·
[
1 + (1 − σ) τL
1 − τL
]
. (56)
28Indeed,  depends on m0 rather than m. Moreover, both m0 and m are independent of τ .
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Using the relationships (1 − x) m′ = m − m0 = α/ (1 − x) and substituting the
relevant derivatives into Eq. 53, we find:
∂τR
∂τ
= 1 − α + m0 ·
[
z − (1 − x) − τL
1 − τL σ L
]
+ (1 − x) m · 
(
2 + (1 − σ) τL
1 − τL
)
.
(57)
From this general expression, we deduce several cases: full actuarial fairness:
α = 1, m0 =  = 0, (with b = 0) and hence ∂τR/∂τ = 0. While the participa-
tion tax rate is zero in this case, there remains a positive implicit tax on young
workers, τL = τ ·
[
1 − 1/R], which is smaller than the statutory rate because
PAYG contributions earn no interest. The other extreme case is no tax–benefit
link, α = m0 = 0, so that ∂τR/∂τ = 1.
The case with a fixed conversion factor independent of retirement behavior,
m = m0 and α = 0, yields an intermediate case. The square bracket in Eq. 57
can safely be assumed positive, at least if the labor supply elasticity is not too
large. In our simple model, the worker-retiree ratio is (1 + x) / (1 − x), which
exceeds unity in a realistic setting. If, instead, considering the effective number
of workers, L + x, and realistically assuming that hours worked of young and
older workers are not too different, i.e., L close to 1, we also have z = L +
x > (1 − x). Therefore, the first two terms in the square bracket are clearly
positive. A natural assumption, which is actually stronger than required, is that
the erosion of the assessment base will not be so large as to exceed the net
effect of the first two terms in the square bracket.
It will also be instructive to consider the case of fixed first-period labor sup-
ply, given by σ =  = 0, which again leads to an increase in the participation
tax rate if the statutory tax rate is raised, ∂τR
∂τ
= 1 − α + m0 [z − (1 − x)] > 0,
α ∈ [0, 1]. By continuity, the total effect on ∂τR
∂τ
remains positive at least for
small values of σ . In any case, the influence of L is likely to be small, given the
econometric evidence on the labor supply response of young workers.
Tax–benefit link Consider the effect of a tighter tax–benefit link m =
α/ (1 − x) + m0, through a rise in m0, starting from m0 = 0. The parameter
α ∈ [0, 1] can take arbitrary values, with α = 0 being one special case. The
partial effect on τR = τ + p − (1 − x) p′ is:
∂τR
∂m0
= ∂p
∂m0
− (1 − x) ∂p
′
∂m0
. (58)
Using τL as given in Eq. 6, and holding x constant, we find that a tax–benefit
link encourages intensive labor supply and thereby expands the assessment
base z = x + L:
m
∂z
∂m0
= m ∂L
∂τL
∂τL
∂m0
= τ − τL
1 − τL · σ L > 0. (59)
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Raising the conversion factor m0 affects the pension level, p = τmz + b , and
the pension increment p′ = τ [mz′ + m′z] in Eq. 15 by:
∂p
∂m0
= τ
[
z + m ∂z
∂m0
]
,
∂p′
∂m0
= τ
[
z′ + m ∂z
′
∂m0
+ m′ ∂z
∂m0
]
. (60)
Since we evaluate the policy change starting from m0 = 0 in the initial equi-
librium, the marginal effect of later retirement on the assessment base is
unity, z′ = 1 + L′ = 1. Given m0 = 0 initially, the term (1 − x) m = α and the
effective tax rate τL = τ
[
1 − (1 − x) m/R] remain constant, and therefore,
first-period labor supply, is independent of retirement age. Consequently, we
obtain:
∂p′
∂m0
= τ
[
1 + m′ ∂z
∂m0
]
. (61)
Combining Eqs. 58–61 and noting that m0 = 0 implies (1 − x) m′ = m, we find:
∂τR
∂m0
= τ [z − (1 − x)] > 0. (62)
Thus, a strengthening of the tax–benefit link (from an initial value of m0 = 0)
results in a partial effect on the participation tax rate corresponding to
∂τR/∂m0 = τ [z − (1 − x)] > 0, where the term in square brackets can safely
assumed, as before, to be positive.
More actuarial fairness Raising the parameter α not only introduces a tighter
tax–benefit link, but also makes it fairer. Again, we assume m0 = 0 initially.
The partial impact on the participation tax rate, τR = τ + p − (1 − x) p′, is:
∂τR
∂α
= ∂p
∂α
− (1 − x) ∂p
′
∂α
. (63)
Using τL in Eq. 6, and holding x constant, we find the pension base z = x + L
grows by:
∂z
∂α
= ∂L
∂τL
∂τL
∂α
= σ L
1 − τL ·
τ
R
> 0. (64)
The conversion factor changes by ∂m/∂α = 1/ (1 − x) and ∂m′/∂α =
1/ (1 − x)2. The tax–benefit link thus affects the pension level p = mτz + b
and the pension increment p′ = τ [m′z + mz′] in Eq. 15 according to:
∂p
∂α
= τ
[
z
1 − x + m
∂z
∂α
]
,
∂p′
∂α
= τ
[
z
(1 − x)2 + m
′ ∂z
∂α
+ 1
1 − x
]
. (65)
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Our assumption of m0 = 0 initially implies that (1 − x) m = α does not vary
with x. Later retirement thus expands the assessment base z = L + x by z′ = 1,
with ∂z′/∂α = 0. Combining Eqs. 63–65 yields, upon using m = (1 − x) m′:
∂τR
∂α
= ∂p
∂α
− (1 − x) ∂p
′
∂α
= −τ. (66)
Consequently, introducing more actuarially fairness reduces the participation
tax rate.
C Preferences
To relate our assumptions on preferences in Section 2.1 to the existing litera-
ture, we consider the general life-cycle problem in which we only impose time
separability, as is usual in macroeconomics. To be concise, we abstract from
the pension system:
V = max
c1,l1,l2,x
u (c1, l1) + βu (c2, l2, x) s.t. c2 = (w1l1 − c1) R + w2l2x. (67)
The modified notation refers to wages wt, intensive labor supply lt , t = 1, 2,
and the subjective discount factor β (≡ 1/R in the main text). Defining partial
derivatives as u1c ≡ ∂u (c1, l1) /∂c1, u1l ≡ ∂u (c1, l1) /∂l1, u2c ≡ ∂u (c2, l2, x) /∂c2,
u2l ≡ ∂u (c2, l2, x) /∂l2, and u2x ≡ du (c2, l2, x) /dx, the resulting optimality
conditions are:
u1c
βu2c
= R, −u
1
l
u1c
= w1, −u
2
l
u2c
= xw2, u
1
l
βu2x
= w1 R
w2l2
. (68)
These conditions express the usual tangency conditions, where the marginal
rates of substitution are equal to relative prices. For example, the last condition
in Eq. 68 refers to the trade-off between the old-age participation rate (retire-
ment date) x and first-period labor supply l1. The marginal rate of substitution
measures by how much old-age participation must decline to compensate for a
marginal increase in first-period labor supply, dx/dl1|dV=0 = −u1l /
(
βu2x
)
. The
right hand side gives the marginal rate of transformation, i.e., the reduction of
old-age participation in exchange for a marginal increase in first-period labor
supply such that life-time income is unchanged.
Income effects substantially complicate the comparative static analysis of
Eq. 68. To focus on incentive effects, a large part of the literature imposes sep-
arability between consumption and labor market activities in each period. Two
recent examples are Cigno (2008) and Fenge and Pestieau (2005). Assuming
fixed labor supply during the economically active part of the second period,
l2 = 1, preferences specialize to:
V = max
c1,l1,x
u (c1 − ϕ (l1)) + βu (c2 − γφ (x)) . (69)
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The analysis in Cigno (2008) corresponds to this case, except that he suppresses
second period participation and, instead, analyzes individual decisions in the
presence of credit constraints. In the absence of the latter, the savings condi-
tion is u1c = β Ru2c . Noting u1l = −u1cϕ′ (l1) and u2x = −u2cγφ′ (x), optimal labor
market activities are given by w1 = ϕ′ (l1) and w2 = γφ′ (x). These conditions
are identical to Eqs. 6 and 12 in the main text, where the pension system
determines consumer prices w1 = 1 − τL and w2 = 1 − τR and, thereby, the
intertemporal trade-off in labor market behavior. In particular, the trade-
off between first and second period labor supply still corresponds to the last
condition in Eq. 68, except that the marginal rate of substitution reduces to:
dx/dl1|dV=0 = −
Rϕ′ (l1)
γφ′ (x)
. (70)
To reiterate, since this paper focusses on labor market behavior rather than
savings, we further specialize preferences in Eq. 2 to be linear in consumption.
Given utc = 1, t = 1, 2, the savings condition above requires 1 = β R. Aside
from fixing the interest rate, this simplification leads to no further restrictions
on labor market behavior.
Given factor prices, the impact of the pension system on l1, x and s follows,
in general, from the comparative statics of Eq. 68, where the third condition
is omitted if l2 = 1 is fixed. As long as income effects are ‘sufficiently small’
compared to substitution effects, our qualitative results are not affected.
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